November 2, 1999	atimes.com

The Koreas Following is a translation of the full text of the ''press-reform'' document revealed by Rep Chung Hyung-keun of South Korea's opposition Grand National Party on October 25. Adjustment of the External Climate for Successful Reform (1) In-depth Analysis of the Crisis The current crisis faced by the ''People's Government'' is a result of many internal factors. These include a serious ''letting down of the guard'' and inadequate material and systematic response to domestic issues. -In particular the ''Dress Scandal'' and the ''Labor Unionists Taming Plot'' have driven a major wedge between the government and the average citizen and the labor sectors (two groups which have been the current government's major supporters). -Although other administrations had to deal with minor troubles, they did not have to deal with these types of major incidents in such a short period (1 1/2 years) after their inaugurations. -It is because major newspapers like Chosun Ilbo , JoongAng Ilbo and Dong-A Ilbo have consistently reported and exaggerated these incidents (in a fashion stronger than previously) that criticism of the current government has become so heated. -Therefore a crisis control plan must be launched as soon as possible on the basis of new countermeasures directed against the press including an inside arrangement with the coalition United Liberal Democrats (ULD). -Of note is that there has now arisen anti-Cholla sentiment among the Korean public led by the press. This means that there should be some distancing of the press from the opposition party. It is imperative that ''shock therapy'' be administered to reverse these recent trends. -The new policy toward the press should be in place by August as the 16th General Election (to be held in April 2000) is not far off. (2) The Change in Attitude by the Domestic Press -In general the press held a neutral stance when the current government took power in early 1998, but this year this attitude has changed. We noted their blunt criticism and cynicism. When the bill for the arrest of opposition Assemblyman Suh Sang-mok was rejected in the National Assembly, the domestic press en masse began to attack the government, broadly challenging its power. -In particular, after Dong-A Ilbo, which had been classified as pro-Kim administration, followed the lead of the already critical and conservative Chosun Ilbo and turned anti-governmental in tone, even JoongAng Ilbo, which had been neutral, changed to an anti-government stance. -The change demonstrated by Dong-A Ilbo was due to several factors. The first was the particular character of its owner, however the second and more compelling reason is seen as being a business tactic. By attempting to regain its original reputation as an ''opposition paper,'' Dong-A hopes to hide the fact that it is no less competitive than Chosun Ilbo or JoongAng Ilbo. -Dong-A's attitude is thought to have encouraged JoongAng Ilbo to be more critical, which it has become following the ''Dress Scandal.'' -These papers explain that this change in attitude should be construed as being simply ''constructive criticism'' of the government. In fact, however, taking full advantage of these attacks on the weak points in the current administration and thus weakening it further, their intention is to establish a position of superiority over the administration. (3) What Problems Will Arise if These Issues are Not Addressed -By loosening the restraints on Korea's major newspapers and allowing reforms to proceed on their own, it is true that our ability to curb the press has been seriously weakened. On the other hand, the newspaper owners believe that in the past year many of the weaknesses of the present administration have been exposed and, with this advantage in hand, they can have their way with the government. -We must take note of the fact that following the Suh incident and a series of other scandals that an anti-Cholla public sentiment is steadily graining ground. The press is responsible for the development and intensification of this sentiment and if we do nothing, then we cannot rule out the possibility that this anti-Cholla sentiment will become a real issue. -In particular we have to remember that because of next year's General Elections, etc. the administration cannot help but be in a weak position vis-a-vis the press. It is obvious that the press will take advantage of this situation to launch a general attack against the government and attempt to establish a position of superiority and expand its influence. -Korea's ''Big 3'' newspapers (Chosun, JoongAng, Dong-A) serve as opinion leaders. If they all stick firmly to an anti-government attitude in their reporting we are faced with a situation where instead of dealing with the powers targeted for reform by the administration, we will have a difficult fight with the press. This means reform efforts will face a huge stumbling block and the ramifications will have a negative impact on the general elections. -Therefore a decisive and fundamental response towards the press is urgently called for. It is very important that of the ''Big 3'' we have to make one a pro-government paper and the remaining two (at the very least) must not be allowed to continue to maintain their very obvious anti-government positions. -We have to remember that those in the ruling party who have served as our conduits to press, yet who being conscious of their own position, will not want to play the role of ''bad guy'' for long. In this situation, even if there are many who would want to play the role that Lee Won-jung did (Lee, who served during the Kim Young-sam administration, consistently supported and promoted the government's position despite the personal criticism he suffered) by playing ''soft ball'' with the press our control of it will continue to weaken. In the near future we cannot rule out ending up facing the worst possible scenario where we were constrained by the press and had to compromise with it. -Therefore in order to be successful in this reform of the press upon which we are staking the fate of both the present administration and the nation, it is urgent that a bold plan be rapidly implemented which includes a fundamental re-evaluation of policy towards the press and a strengthening of our control of it. (4) Specific Measures for Press Reform A. Reform Movements Based on Principle -The principle of our reform is that the press is not a privileged institution that is immune from outside interference. We have to approach this issue by establishing a firm principle: the press is, like a private company subject to the universal principles of the market. -The reason is that unfavorable side-effects like a loss of the administration's power may arise if it appears that such reform is being undertaken for the benefit of a certain party or to satisfy old grudges. -Thus at a point in time when President Kim Dae-jung's four major reforms are starting to take hold, reform of the press must be conducted at a very intensive level. If we apply the universal principles of democracy and market economics to press reform, the press will lose any clear grounds for denying this and we will gain the positive support of the people. B. Pursuit of Rapid Reform of the System -We will make a strong demand for the rectification of practices common up until now at newspapers like tax evasion, illegal insider deals, etc. If violations are discovered we must make them pay a correspondingly high price. If after a year these issues are not addressed voluntarily, then we will use this as justification for the ''Big 3'' being subject to secret investigations by the relevant authorities. -The government agencies that could participate in press reform are Chong Wa Dae (the Blue House), the National Intelligence Service, the prosecution and police along with the Board of Audit and Inspection, the Office of National Tax Administration, the Fair Trade Commission, the Financial Supervisory Commission and regional governments (or city governments, if they can manage this). -However in order to avoid the charge of coercion of the press and/or unifying various newspapers against us, a specific standing committee for press reform should not be established. Rather such actions should be discussed at internal meetings held from time to time with care taken to ensure that the contents of these meetings are not leaked to the public. -Of note is that it is necessary to establish a command post to manage this press reform program. Otherwise in the process of coping with a variety of issues, this effort may be interrupted. -All newspaper companies, including Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo have consistently engaged in illegal activities. These activities include the evasion of value-added taxes (inflating circulation figures to increase advertising revenue while reducing circulation when making tax calculations), special treatment from banks as well as embezzlement undertaken by their owners). -Our demands for the rectification of such illegal acts by newspapers should be made while we are in the process of working on the restructuring of companies. We should stress that all companies should conform to the principles of transparency and law in order to overcome the economic crisis. We should demand that newspapers end the practice of forcing companies to place ads or asking for excessive rates. We can earn the support of those companies, which have fallen victim to those practices, and garner popular support. -We should investigate again the benefits that are bestowed on newspaper organizations in recognition of their function as public institutions. Therefore, there is bound to be an impact in the event that those benefits (which newspapers considered to be natural prerogatives) are threatened on papers whose financial structures have already been weakened by the recent financial crisis. -Thus we need to have investigations into and proposals on those points done by the appropriate organizations. Following that, and after an analysis of the possible fallout from the government's actions, we need to shift these proposals into actions in a first, second and third phase process on a case-by-case basis. -In this event will be able to force newspapers with already weak financial positions like Hankuk Ilbo, Saekae Ilbo, Munhwa Ilbo, and Kyunghyang Shinmun in bankruptcy, since the structural problems that face already mean that foreclosure on their debt is merely a matter of time. -Along with these measures we should make a strong call for responsible management on the part of owners. In line with our policy of seeking responsibility on the part of the heads of major companies, will should call on owners for an increase in the transparency of newspapers . C. General Purge of Anti-Reform Powers -We must isolate from the production process anti-reform powers (and especially their leaders) in control at newspapers in conjunction with our other activities. That is because it is these people who are responsible for the increase of the negative criticism of the government. -Isolating these individuals is the most desirable policy as it is impossible to expect that reform will come voluntarily. -If we publicize the huge financial ''gifts'' given by certain parties during the 1992 and the 1998 elections to some corrupt journalists (generally PK, TK) this will cause a massive uproar within the journalistic community and prompt a movement on the part of the papers themselves to rid themselves of these corrupt individuals. - In order to get rid of these journalists, we must acquire absolutely certain evidence and leak it to other organizations like ''Media Today'' used this as a basis for instigating investigations on the part of the legal authorities. -Another good direction to head it would be to attack provincial newspapers. Their illegal practices have already been the subject of widely held grievances by local citizens. We should send the message that they are involved with corrupt construction projects and/or other local malfeasance. The angle would be that we are establishing social justice by the expulsion of corrupt journalists and fostering a healthy press. D. Dealing with the ''Big 3'' -It will be necessary to conduct thorough investigations of both the ''Big 3'' newspapers for tax evasion and the like and, at the same time, of the families of their owners for illegal activities. -Once the investigations are completed, then we should get a newspaper like the Hankaure (which does not have conflict of interest problems with the ''Big 3'') to report on it and turn this into a social issue that places the government in a good light. -If either the Chosun Ilbo or Dong-A Ilbo should come up with countermeasures, then until all issues are resolved, the government should maintain a firm attitude that it is attacking the problem from top to bottom. We could encounter a strong counterattack if our case weakens midway through the investigation. -If we conduct a thorough investigation of JoongAng Ilbo for tax evasion, then the problem should resolve itself without difficulty. -Our first target should be the Chosun Ilbo, followed by JoongAng Ilbo and the other newspapers. Since fighting the industry as a whole will be a great challenge, then we must be prepared with as great a strategy. E. The Method for Maximizing the Effect -We must first develop public sympathy for our effects in light of the special nature of newspapers. Thus it is desirable, whether or not we use the term ''newspaper reform'' to follow a general principle of ''first reform the system and later purge the personnel.'' -After the impact of the system reform begins to take effect, then we need a concentrated attack with concrete cases. The effect of this can be diminished if one or the other, despite our efforts, is overly emphasized. There is the worry that our efforts may end up spiraling out of control if this develops into a fight with all of journalism. -We have to be careful in selecting cases about the possible unexpected results. As in the case of Lee Hyun-rak, of Dong-A Ilbo (charges were made of illegal speculation in real estate, but never fully checked, thus causing the reaction that Dong-A Ilbo was being subjected to governmental pressure) we must make sure that our efforts don't incur the opposite of what we intend. -Therefore when selecting specific cases, kept the scope narrow and have concrete evidence. -We have to remember that we may cause the exact opposite effect of what we are planning if our efforts at press reform appear too contrived. Thus we must always give our rationale as being reform of the system and then proceed with specific cases. -Since the ''Big 3's'' biggest weaknesses are in the area of possible tax evasion, if the National Tax Administration (NTA) and the Fair Trade Commission take the lead, then we can expect success in the systematic reform of the press. -In the aftermath of IMF, it is possible that newspapers have developed new ways of evading taxes in order to stay afloat. The NTA will have to do specific investigations into this. -As part of our ''shock therapy'' before August, we might consider instigating an all-out investigation directed against the owners and/or executives of a newspaper. In the event they don't believe we can ''take'' one of their owners, then the tension generated by our actions will make it impossible for the current anti-DJ sentiment to continue. -As President Kim stated ''By mid-August [he will come up with] an acceptable constitutional revision of the cabinet system'' we have to be fairly well along with our reform of the press. Then we must use the time during the regular session of the National Assembly to deal with changes in the law. (Source: JoongAng Ilbo, Oct 27, 1999)

Front | China | Southeast Asia | Japan | Koreas | India/Pakistan | Central Asia/Russia | Oceania Business Briefs | Global Economy | Asian Crisis | Media/IT | Editorials | Letters | Search/Archive

back to the top ©1999 Asia Times Online Co., Ltd.

Korea Asian Sex News | Asian Sex Gazette