June 21, 2001	atimes.com

The Koreas The price of uncertainty: What Koreans want By Ralph A Cossa Introduction On the surface, relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have never seemed better or more filled with promise. Since the unprecedented June 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang between ROK President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, there has been a steady stream of dialogue and interaction, including an equally unprecedented meeting of both nations' defense ministers in South Korea in September 2000 and three highly-emotional exchange visits of families separated since the 1950-53 Korean War. In addition, Kim Jong-il has made two trips to China in the past 12 months, one just before his historic summit with Kim Dae-jung and the other in mid-January of this year. His praise for China's modernization efforts - "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" - has raised hopes that Pyongyang is intent on genuine economic reform as it opened up more to the South and the world at large; the latter including the opening of diplomatic relations with numerous Asian and European nations, beginning with Italy in January 2000. In addition, while the pace of United States-DPRK contacts understandably slowed down as the new administration in Washington was taking shape, President George W Bush has pledged support for President Kim's North-South reconciliation effort and promised to continue Washington's own dialogue with Pyongyang, albeit with more skepticism and at a slower pace than his predecessor. The Bush administration has also firmly endorsed the ROK-US alliance. Underscoring this fact, President Kim Dae-jung enjoyed the distinction of being the first Asian leader to visit Bush in Washington, on March 7. But, if things are going so well, why does everyone in Seoul seem so nervous? The answer comes down to one word: uncertainty. Seoul is uncertain about North Korean intentions and Pyongyang's willingness to give as well as to take, and it is far from certain if President Kim can develop, much less sustain, broad domestic political support for his policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea (also known as the "Sunshine" policy). There is also uncertainly as to if and when North Korean leader Kim Jong-il will come to the South and even greater uncertainty over Seoul's ability to successfully manage the visit. Seoul is also uncertain about Washington's true intentions regarding rapprochement with North Korea, while many in Washington remain suspicious of Kim Jong-il's so-called "peace offensive". This article will look at North Korean motivations and intentions and the current status of North-South relations, while also addressing ROK domestic uncertainties and the US factor in the peninsula security equation. I will end with a few words about the planned second North-South Summit. North Korea: Reform or just survival? Most analysts attribute North Korea's willingness to respond positively to ROK President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy first and foremost to Kim Jong-il's desire for regime (and personal) survival. Given the dire economic conditions in the North - including years of wide-spread famine and massive starvation - and the equally untenable political situation caused by the collapse of its long-time Soviet benefactors, Pyongyang had little option other than to look beyond the Hermit Kingdom for support if it was to survive. It was either this or even greater reliance on China, a nation that liked to drive a hard bargain and that also placed equal or greater importance on its own rapprochement with Seoul. For decades, Kim Jong-il's father, North Korean founder Kim Il-sung, had successfully played Moscow and Beijing against one another, garnering considerable support from his two giant communist neighbors while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy from both. As the Cold War was drawing to a rapid close (everywhere except on the Korean peninsula), the elder Kim pursued his own opening up policy with the South, resulting in the 1991-92 Basic Agreement on North-South cooperation. Unfortunately, regime changes in Washington and Seoul and the subsequent crisis over the North's threatened withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty brought that earlier attempt at reconciliation to an abrupt halt. Then, just when relations between North and South and between Washington and Pyongyang were settling down, Kim Il-sung died. Following his father's death in 1994, Kim Jong-il seemed initially to have focused his efforts on consolidating his own power and control over the North's society and military. While it is hard to assess North Korean domestic politics with any degree of certainty, most analysts believe that Kim has indeed achieved this goal. This has made it possible for him to be more receptive toward the South. The fact that his father had endorsed a North-South dialogue process before he died also made it easier for the junior Kim to follow this path. So too did the change in leadership in the South from the seemingly unreliable Kim Young-sam - who "gravely insulted" North Korea by not extending condolences upon Kim Il-sung's death - to the more charismatic Kim Dae-jung, who was viewed more positively by Pyongyang, given his years of strong opposition to previous military governments in the South. Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy, which offered the prospects of economic assistance along with a promise not to attempt to absorb the North, seemed sufficient to entice Pyongyang to enter into serious negotiations with Seoul, resulting in the June 2000 summit. It is, quite frankly, too soon to tell if the North's willingness to talk will be matched by a willingness to take the steps necessary to bring about lasting peace on the peninsula, first in the form of peaceful coexistence between two separate states and then through some form of federation or confederation or true reunification. Significantly, Pyongyang still insists that a Korean War peace treaty (to replace the current 48-year-old armistice) should be signed between the United States and North Korea and not with the government in Seoul, a demand that Washington and Seoul (rightfully) find unacceptable. Even the June 2000 Joint Statement between the two Korean leaders, historic and groundbreaking as it was, did not contain any reference to the word "peace". And, while Kim Dae-jung has assured Washington on several occasions that Kim Jong-il told him that North Korea no longer objects to the presence of US military forces on the peninsula, North Korean propaganda still calls for their removal. While North Korea has been quick to demand and accept economic assistance from South Korea (and elsewhere) and has been willing to enter into high-level negotiations, the breakthroughs remain largely symbolic rather than substantive, raising concerns in the South (and in the United States) about the lack of North Korean actions aimed at substantially reducing its current, formidable military threat to the South. North-South Relations: Waiting for Reciprocity Kim Jong-il has bragged to visitors that he watches ROK television and reads Southern newspapers. As a result, he must be fully aware of growing opposition to the "Sunshine" policy, not because anyone thinks that engaging the North is bad, but because the process is increasingly being described as a one-way street. For example, last fall the ROK government unilaterally released a large group of North Korean spies and prisoners of conscience. The North has yet to reciprocate, even though such a move would cost it little or nothing. This is symptomatic of the "all get, no give" North Korean approach largely exhibited in North-South exchanges to date. Even the divided families program, which has seen three reciprocal visits (most recently in February 2001), remains tightly controlled by the North, which has refused home visits or more unstructured events in favor of tightly-controlled meetings at designated hotels. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of elderly South Koreans are eager to join the several hundred who have thus far been lucky enough to win the reunion lottery and visit with long-lost family. At the current rate of exchange - roughly 100 persons from each side being reunited on the average of every two to three months - most of the first generation of divided families will not live to see their separated kinfolk. Pyongyang needs to cooperate more fully with Seoul in speeding up the program. Of greatest importance, North Korea needs to signal its willingness to enter into serious security discussions with the South aimed at reducing tensions through the development of military confidence building measures (CBMs). To date, Pyongyang has refused even to acknowledge Seoul as a legitimate dialogue partner on security issues (insisting that such talks be with Washington instead). At a minimum, Pyongyang should signal its willingness, without preconditions, to accept Kim Dae-jung's call for a resumption of Four-Party Talks (involving the United States and China along with the two Koreas). Included in the Four-Party Talks arrangement is an agreed upon but not yet activated working group to discuss Peninsula Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which could provide the vehicle for direct North-South dialogue on security matters. A resumption of Four-Party Talks, last held in August 1999, would have the added benefit of compelling the Bush administration to focus on North Korea issues in a positive way. The North's seemingly preferred way of getting Washington's attention - by creating a crisis - is likely to have far less positive results. ROK: Can domestic consensus be achieved? The greatest immediate threat to President Kim's "Sunshine" policy comes not from Pyongyang or Washington, however, but from Seoul. President Kim has failed to develop a bipartisan consensus for his policy approach toward the North and even US-ROK relations are being drawn into partisan politics. For example, attempts by visiting US congressmen and defense contractors to promote American weapons systems - which is, after all, what they get paid to do - and a reported reference by US Secretary of State Colin Powell regarding Washington's hope that Seoul favorably consider the F-15E in choosing its next generation fighter aircraft (over Russian and French/European competitors) have been portrayed by opposition politicians and some media critics as "strong-armed American pressure" on Korea. This comes amid ridiculous accusations that President Kim might trade an F-15 deal for an American endorsement of his policies - even though such an endorsement has already been received and is in American interests. From an admittedly biased US perspective, selection of the F-15E also makes great sense, given requirements for interoperability and the need for absolutely reliable resupply in the event of hostilities on the peninsula. More importantly, some opposition leaders, led by former president Kim Young-sam, have been demanding that North Korea issue an apology for its 1950 invasion and admit guilt for a variety of past sins before Kim Jong-il is allowed to go to Seoul. Their goal appears not so much aimed at aborting the visit as ensuring that President Kim gains little domestic credit for this significant accomplishment. When pressed, opposition leaders will acknowledge that any future ROK leader would have little option other than to continue Kim Dae-jung's outreach program. But scant effort has been made by either side to craft a bipartisan approach that would put the peace process first. From an outsider's perspective, the "Sunshine" policy makes good sense. It embraces both cooperation and deterrence and rests on three basic principles: first, the ROK will not tolerate armed provocations of any kind; second, the South does not intend to absorb North Korea; and third, Seoul will actively promote exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea. Inherent in this policy approach was a decision to separate politics from economic cooperation and humanitarian assistance. It represents a long-term approach, calling for a gradual opening-up of the North and confidence-building measures today that will hopefully pave the way for eventual reunification. The philosophy, since borne out, was that the less the North Korean regime felt imminently threatened, the less likely it was to lash out in irrational ways and the more likely it was to enter into negotiations. The "Sunshine" policy also made a virtue out of necessity. The Asian financial crisis's impact on Korea, combined with earlier sobering estimates of the cost of reunification (based on extensive study of the German experience), had convinced most South Koreans that it was impossible to bear the cost of near-term reunification. As a result, a gradual approach made more sense economically as well as politically. But, the logic of reconciliation and sunshine notwithstanding, the North-South peace process has become deeply embroiled in ROK domestic politics. This is where President Kim needs to wave a few olive branches in a Southerly direction. As one frustrated Korean put it, "President Kim has spent more time consulting with the Americans and Japanese on his North Korea policy than he has with the Korean people themselves." In order to alleviate anxiety, the world's newest Nobel Peace laureate needs to exert as much effort mending fences at home as he does building bridges abroad, since international support for his policies will be for naught if domestic consensus cannot be achieved. The US Factor The United States has a critical role to play in helping to facilitate North-South reconciliation. Washington's primary role is to provide the necessary security guarantees to the ROK through the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, in order to make Seoul comfortable enough to enter into serious negotiations with Pyongyang. The security alliance also has served as a deterrent to North Korean military actions and as a reminder to Pyongyang that North-South negotiations are the only viable way to achieve reunification. One of the major accomplishments of the Clinton administration was the strong signal it sent to Pyongyang that Washington and Seoul spoke with one voice as far as a peninsula peace regime was concerned - there would be no separate peace agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. The Clinton administration's ability, largely through the efforts of special Korea emissary (and former Defense Secretary) William Perry, to establish close trilateral cooperation with Tokyo as well as Seoul under the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) also contributed to Pyongyang's decision to talk directly to Seoul rather than fruitlessly pursue a "divide and conquer" strategy. This close trilateral cooperation is expected to continue with the new US administration. During his early March summit meeting in Washington with President Kim, President Bush provided a strong reaffirmation of America's defense commitment to the ROK and the need for continued military deterrence. President Kim has himself long argued for a continued presence of US military forces on the peninsula, even after North-South reconciliation or reunification, to underwrite regional peace and security. President Kim also sought and received President Bush's endorsement for the South's policy of reconciliation and engagement with North Korea, even though Bush expressed his own skepticism about the North's intentions, while stressing the need for "complete verification" in dealing with Pyongyang. As the US continues to outline its strategy toward North Korea, President Kim will also want the Bush administration to wave some olive branches in Pyongyang's direction, but these are likely to be few in number and slow in coming. Second North-South Summit The next major moment of truth for the peninsula peace process will come with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's much anticipated visit to the South - it had been tentatively scheduled for April or June). His failure to meet this commitment to pay a return visit has been a setback. On the other hand, the South remains nervous about summit atmospherics, especially given the enthusiastic (even if totally orchestrated) welcome Kim Dae-jung received during his visit to Pyongyang. Many opposition groups have promised loud protests, which could become unruly, thus causing Kim Dae-jung (and the South Korean nation) a bit of embarrassment. Some thought had apparently been given to holding the return summit on Cheju Island, where the environment could be more easily controlled, but it would appear that anything less than a Seoul visit will be seen, by supporters as well as opponents of the visit, as totally inappropriate. This reinforces the above-stated need for President Kim to make peace with the opposition before the visit, so that protests can be held to a minimum. Skeptics in South Korea (and in the US) will be closely watching for some gestures by the North Korean leader that he is fully committed to the peninsula peace process. In this regard, it would not hurt President Kim to lay out more clearly and publicly the specific steps he would like North Korea to take in order to demonstrate its commitment to the reconciliation process. Kim should also clearly define - and Washington should then endorse - his specific objectives for Kim Jong-il's visit to the South well in advance of the actual visit. This will help put pressure on the North to move beyond symbolism and will help remove uncertainty both in the ROK and in the United States about the long-term viability of North-South rapprochement. Previous articles in this Heartland series on the issues relating to the Korean peninsula: Fig leaf Jun 15 A Chinese viewpoint Jun 15 ((c) Heartland. This version has been edited by Asia Times Online.) 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