Asia Times: The Korean peninsular's imperfect past


	July 21, 2001	atimes.com

The Koreas

The Korean peninsula's imperfect past
By Mark B M Suh

Ten years ago no other people in the world were more pleased than Koreans about the peaceful unification of Germany. Even now most Koreans look at Germany with envy, admiration and hope that a similar miracle will soon occur in Korea. Although some Koreans think it unjust that Germany was united before Korea since Korea was divided unjustly, they comfort themselves by believing that Korea can learn from Germany.

After the end of the Cold War, a few attempts to change the situation in Korea and to end the prolonging confrontation failed, mainly because of mutual distrust and of lack of contacts among its people. After Kim Dae-jung became president of South Korea in 1998, a new round of cautious approaches has started. The historical June 2000 summit meeting between the top leaders of the two Koreas has awakened high hopes for unification and for a peace process. Since then there is increasing official interaction, but still only limited and controlled contacts among the people of the divided nation.

The unsolved 'Korean Question'

The origin of the conflict between the two Koreas is to be found in the artificial division of Korea after World War II and in the failure to reach an agreement on the method to be used for returning independence to Korea by the occupying powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The main aim in temporarily dividing Korea militarily along the 38th parallel was to coordinate the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Korea. However, because of the emerging Cold War between the two major powers, two contrasting political systems were established in the occupation zones, with each side refusing to recognize the other and claiming sole jurisdiction and legitimacy for the whole of Korea.

The desire to unify the country was equally strong in both parts of the country. After the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, the South wanted to "restore the lost land" and the North wanted to "liberate the southern half of the Republic". The North, economically and militarily much stronger than the South, decided to solve the problem of non-recognition and of the division by military means. Kim Il-sung went to Moscow in April to convince Stalin, and in May 1950 to China to obtain the approval of Mao. In Moscow he could secure Stalin's support in return for political as well as some material gains for Korea.(1) At the beginning, Stalin was cautious and against the adventure, but was convinced by Kim Il-sung that the war could be won quickly without US intervention.

As the North Korean troops launched a surprise attack against the South in the early morning of June 25 1950, President Henry S Truman responded quickly by sending troops from Japan to Korea and mobilized the UN to undertake its first-ever international military action. Unfortunately for the North, the Soviet Union was not present at the UN Security Council at that time in protest against the non-recognition of communist China by the UN, so it was unable to veto the action against the North. On the same day, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion as a breach of peace and an act of aggression and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to the 38th parallel. With the refusal of North Korea to withdraw from the South, Truman decided to intervene in Korea, and on June 27, 1950 the Security Council called for members to help South Korea.

The Security Council decided on July 7,1950 to establish a Unified Command for the UN Forces in Korea and mandated a joint military action to repel the troops from the North and to restore the status quo in Korea. General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the US government as the supreme commander of the UN forces in Korea, and South Korean president Rhee Syng-man put the South Korean military under his command.(2) The UN military action in Korea, taken by the US Eighth Army under General MacArthur, was able to accomplish its mission by October 7, 1950 by restoring the status quo in Korea. The war could have ended here.

However, sensing an opportunity not only to stop but also to roll back communist expansion and to unify the country by force, General MacArthur and president Rhee Syng-man decided to march forward to the North. Truman approved orders for UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to push the enemy above the Yalu River, although communist China had warned repeatedly against such an action. By October 25, some advance units had reached the Yalu river and victory was close, but they were confronted with an unexpected enemy, the Chinese "volunteers". The Chinese began to move into North Korea in massive numbers and together with North Korean troops started an offensive. They pushed back UN forces to below the 38th parallel, and recaptured Seoul in January 1951. The conflict had developed into a limited international war involving the United States and 19 other nations on one side and China and North Korea on the other.

As the military situation developed unfavorably for the Allied forces, General MacArthur asked Truman to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against China and North Korea. Fortunately, although some US military leaders favored the nuclear option, Truman decided not to use the weapons for a number of reasons.(3) He discharged General MacArthur over this issue and redefined American policy by abandoning his objective of military reunification of Korea. His aim was now a return to the status quo, even as the Chinese and North Koreans were advancing southward. Truman was unwilling to engage in an all-out war which could have led to a world war involving the Soviet Union.

As the war reached a new phase with massive intervention of Chinese "volunteers", the UN General Assembly formally proposed a ceasefire in December 1950. Following some preparatory talks, representatives of the UN and communist commands began formal truce negotiations in July 1951 at Kaesong, North Korea. Only in 1953, with the death of Stalin and with the arrival of President Dwight Eisenhower in the White House, did the bitter fighting come to an end, with heavy casualties in both sides. An armistice agreement between the UN forces, represented by the US, and China and North Korea was drawn up and signed.(4)

South Korean president Rhee Syng-man, however, wanting to unify the country with the help of the US, refused to sign the truce agreement.(5) Instead, he signed a mutual defense treaty with the US in October 1953 and arranged for the continued presence of US forces in South Korea.(6) The subsequent Geneva Conference on Korea in April 1954 failed to find a political solution to the "Korea Question".

The failure of the two attempts - one by the North and one by the South - to unify the peninsula by force only deepened the division, making any contact with each other impossible. To make the situation even more complicated, another historical mistake was made by the North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung, in 1961. He misinterpreted the military coup by General Park Chung-hee and young officers in South Korea on May 16, 1961 as an attempt by the US and South Korea to invade North Korea. Within two weeks after the military coup in the South, Kim Il-sung rushed to Moscow and Beijing, and signed security treaties with these socialist countries.(7) Consequently, these moves were viewed in South Korea and the US as an evidence of North Korean determination to invade and spread communism to the South by force.

With the announcement of the visit by US president Richard Nixon to communist China in 1972, North and South Korea attempted briefly to end the confrontation and improve relations. Lee Hu-rak (then director of the South Korean intelligence, KCIA) and Kim Young-joo (brother of Kim Il-sung) met secretly in Pyongyang and Seoul, and agreed on the principles of a peaceful reunification, self-reliance and cooperation. However, instead of improved relations and exchanges between people, an arms race started. In the North, with the revision of the constitution, a personal state of Kim Il-sung who now became president, emerged. In the South, president Park Chung-hee began in 1972 his military dictatorship under the yushin constitution. The perceived security threat from the other regime served as legitimacy.

After the sudden death of president Park in 1979, general Chun Doo-hwan took over the power by military coup under the pretext of the North Korean threat. Surprisingly, after a flood in the South, the North offered humanitarian aid to the South in 1984. For the first time in history, North Korea sent rice to flood victims in South Korea through the Red Cross. The semi-official contacts between the Red Cross of the two Koreas, led to the first family reunion of 50 people from each side in September 1985. Due to the domestic situation in the course of democratization in South Korea, however, no further improvement in relations followed and hostility between the two Koreas remained.

With the beginning of the new democratization process in South Korea from 1987, with a new constitution and president as well as the successful Summer Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988, a new attempt to change the situation was initiated by the South. The democratically elected president of the South, Roh Tae-woo, started to loosen its hard anti-communist policy and initiated a new foreign and security policy called Nordpolitik. South Korea not only normalized its diplomatic relations with communist Eastern bloc countries including the Soviet Union but also improved commercial ties despite strong diplomatic pressures from the North, and it also tried to normalize relations with the North.

The 'Korean Question' after German unification

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, pressures as well as hopes of an early reunification grew primarily in the South. North and South Korea began to negotiate at the prime minister level. From 1988 to 1992, a series of meetings took place and two important documents were signed: Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North in 1991, and the joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in 1992. Both Koreas joined the UN as full members in 1991. Yet unlike the two Germanys in 1972, the two Koreas failed to recognize each other because of domestic political reasons. As between 1992 and 1994 the nuclear issue of North Korea triggered an international crisis, attempts to accommodate each other failed and instead the danger of a renewed military confrontation increased.

The crisis escalated further and a military conflict on the peninsula seemed unavoidable.(8) Former US president Jimmy Carter made a surprise visit to North Korea and defused the crisis. North Korea offered to "freeze" the nuclear program, and the US agreed to begin the third round of comprehensive negotiations with North Korea on July 8, 1994, in Geneva.(9) Surprisingly, a historical first-ever summit meeting between the presidents of the two Koreas was even scheduled. Shortly before the summit meeting, as the delegates of the US and North Korea began to negotiate in Geneva, North Korean president Kim Il-sung suddenly died. The planned summit meeting was cancelled and negotiations in Geneva were postponed.

In August, high-level delegations resumed negotiations in Geneva. Finally, on October 21, 1994, the US and North Korea signed the Geneva Framework Agreement in their efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, laying the groundwork for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.(10) Interim arrangements were negotiated to defuse the immediate nuclear crisis and to initiate a long-term process to integrate North Korea into the international community, as well as to deter repetition of a potentially catastrophic confrontation. In order to induce North Korea to drop its nuclear weapons program, the US has not only committed itself to deliver two light-water nuclear reactors worth US$5 billion and an interim energy supply, but also to expand diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea.

Although the nuclear crisis was defused peacefully, relations between the two Koreas remained strained and even worsened. President Kim Young-sam refused to allow South Koreans to attend the funeral of Kim Il-sung and adopted a hard-line anti-communist policy again. He responded strongly against the protests of students who wanted to march to the North to discuss unification with North Korean students. Relations between the two Koreas remained tense until Kim Young-sam left office in February 1998.

Unlike his predecessor, President Kim Dae-jung started with friendly gestures to North Korea by seeking reconciliation and cooperation. His engagement policy, known as the "Sunshine" policy, sought direct dialogue with the North and relaxed regulations in dealing with North Korea. In particular, business contacts were encouraged and are less restricted now. As a result of this new policy, one of the largest Korean business groups, Hyundai, started from November 1998 to organize tours to Mount Kumgang in North Korea. Hyundai, however, has to pay a high price for this project and contacts between North and South Korean people during the tour are prohibited. Some in the South, however, see this project as the major success of the new policy.

The South Korean peace gestures first were met with hostile North Korean reactions. During the first year of the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, there were more military incidents between North and South than at any time in history. A North Korean submarine was caught in a fishing net, and there were even aborted infiltrations. But worst of all, the test firing of Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998 by North Korea raised security concern not only in South Korea but also in Japan and the US, and hastened the US decision to build missile defense systems in the US and in the region.

The most surprising response was, however, the North Korean announcement in June 1999 of the non-recognition of the NLL (Northern Limit Line) marking the sea border between the two Koreas. Subsequently, North Korean navy vessels broke into the NLL in pursuit of fishing boats and clashed with South Korean navy. After 10 days of provocation, on June 15, a military clash between two navies occurred which lasted for only 12 minutes but resulted in the deaths of more than 40 North Koreans and saw many others injured. One North Korean warship was sunk and four others were badly damaged. Instead of the expected military retaliation, the North only blamed the South for the action and demanded apology and compensation. This incident, a test of military strength which could have started a war, was the turning point in the North Korean behavior and since then military provocation from the North has been greatly reduced and dialogues increased.

In addition to the worsening economic crisis, the stabilized Kim Jong-il regime and the Kim Dae-jung's unceasing offers to dialogue, as well as pressure from China, brought some radical changes in 2000. Kim Jong-il paid a surprise visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang on March 5, 2000. Kim Dae-jung offered to help the North in his speech at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, on March 9. On April 10, the North and South announced that a summit meeting of the two leaders was to be held in Pyongyang in June. Shortly before the summit, Kim Jong-il paid a visit to China and conferred with the Chinese leadership. Kim Jong-il surprised the world with his warm reception to his arch-enemy from the South. The summit meeting was concluded with the "North-South joint declaration" of June 15, reconfirming the desire to unify Korea. Nevertheless, the expected breakthrough did not come about. Since then, a few high-level meetings took place and only 200 families from each side were allowed for a brief reunion with their families in the South or North.

Prospects for Korean unification

The territorial division of Korea cannot be overcome only by burning national sentiment. Finding a peaceful solution to the "Korean Question" is not feasible at present. Basically because of the contrasting ideas on the ways and means of reaching a political union, unification of the divided nation remains the dream of all Koreans. Unification means the sharing of political power of both sides or the giving up on one political system. Therefore, it seems unrealistic for the current political leaders of the North and South to agree on peaceful unification. The June 2000 summit demonstrated clearly the existence of two strong political systems on the Korean peninsula but at the same time brought a new chance to build peace.

Instead of the all or nothing approach, efforts should be focused on what is feasible. There is no rationale why the same people cannot travel freely back and force when even foreign countries can be visited with visas. Improving the inhumane situation and eliminating the danger of war on the Korean peninsula should be the top priority.

To foster the fragile peace process between the two Koreas and to enable peaceful unification in the future, several steps need to be taken by the US, China and the two Koreas:
* First of all, the two Koreas must commit themselves not to use force to achieve unification, and should end the confrontation. To this end, they should sign a basic treaty recognizing each other as separate systems with sole jurisdiction, and exchange representatives in each capital.(11)
* Once they have normalized relations, they should start negotiations to reduce their armed forces gradually to the level at which neither could be a military threat to the other. The US forces in Korea should guarantee the security of both Koreas.
* The US should establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and seek an early solution to the missile issue.

Notes

(1) 216 secret Soviet documents which Russian president Boris Yeltsin presented to South Korean president Kim Young-sam on June 1994 reveal that Kim Il-sung could not start a war without Soviet approval. Stalin was interested in getting 25,000 tons of lead per year. See Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No 5, Spring 1995, pp. 1-9.

(2) The US forces, those of South Korea and combat contingents from Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, with medical units from Denmark, India, and Sweden, were placed under a unified UN command headed by the US commander in chief in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur.

(3) General MacArthur was strongly in favor of using nuclear weapons on Korea and on China. For the political and military considerations of employment of nuclear weapons during the Korean War, see D Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War", Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1988, pp. 177-207.

(4) The US suffered 157,530 casualties; deaths from all causes totalled 33,629, of which 23,300 occurred in combat. South Korea sustained 1,312,836 military casualties, including 415,004 dead; casualties among other UN allies totaled 16,532, including 3,094 dead. Chinese casualties were for some time exaggerated and believed to be around 2 million. For the first time, Chinese leader Hu Yao-bang revealed to East German leader Erich Honecker in October 1986 in Beijing that China sent over 1 million "volunteers" to Korea but suffered 390,000 casualties. Furthermore, China spent billions of dollars to buy arms and ammunition from the USSR. Mao's only son was killed during the war in Korea. It took 30 years to normalize relations between the US and China.

(5) For the role of the US in Korea and president Rhee Syng-man's refusal to sign the truce agreement, see R T Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, Seoul 1978, Panmun Book Co.

(6) For the text of the treaty, see Se-jin Kim (ed.), Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction, Seoul 1978, Research Center for Peace and Unification, pp. 183-184.

(7) This was revealed in the confidential documents of the former East German government. East German intelligence reported to East Berlin that Kim Il-sung was overreacting to the domestic development in South Korea.

(8) Secretary of Defense William Perry revealed in Congress details of a plan to fight a war with North Korea after bombing the nuclear complex in Yonbyon in summer 1994. UPI, January 24, 1995; A B Carter and W J Perry, Preventive Diplomacy: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington, D.C. 1999, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 127-128.

(9) The "freeze" includes commitments by North Korea not to reload the reactor with new fuel, not to reprocess the spent fuel, and to allow inspectors continuous access to the spent fuel storage pond.

(10) See R Nelson and K Weisbrode, "Interim Arrangements for North Korea: Are They Secure?", Bulletin of the Atlantic Council, vol. V, no. 12, December 30, 1994, pp. 1-4.

(11) The two German states signed a basic treaty recognizing each other in 1972; this was no hindrance to later unification.

Previous articles in this Heartland series on the issues relating to the Korean peninsula include:

* Fig leaf (Jun 15)

* A Chinese viewpoint (Jun 15)

* The price of uncertainty: What Koreans want (Jun 20)

* Why China needs one Korea (Jul 5)

((c) Heartland. This version has been edited by Asia Times Online.)
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