Asia Times: Military's actions in Timor the key to Indonesia's future



	September 09, 1999	atimes.com

Southeast Asia

Military's actions in Timor the key to Indonesia's future
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence
Update September 8, 1999

Summary:

As the world focuses on East Timor in the wake of the self-determination referendum, the implications of the vote may be of significance beyond determining the future of half of an Indonesian island. The stability of the country may well rest on the events unfolding around the East Timor crisis. In the midst of this uncertainty and more significantly the presidential succession, Indonesia relies on the military to be a stabilizing force. However, this force is not unified. The potential ramifications of this military split are monumental.

Analysis:

The situation in East Timor has reached critical mass. Most international observers have fled the province. UN staff in East Timor report that phone communication out of Dili has been cut. The Indonesian military has moved in to restore order under recently declared martial law. There are approximately 15,000 army troops in East Timor, along with 8,000 police. However, this is the same military that has been accused of fomenting and facilitating much of the current violence.

This raises questions. First, will the military be willing and able to stop the violence? Second, who has control of the situation? While the answers are not entirely clear, they nonetheless may determine the future of Indonesia as a nation.

At a time when the recent elections have made the future Indonesian leadership unclear, Indonesia's social and political cohesiveness is increasingly dependent on the one overarching organization that can maintain unity - the military. The military and the ruling Golkar party were the bastions of stability in Indonesia throughout former President Suharto's regime. Golkar represented the bureaucracy, permeating all layers of Indonesian society. Anyone involved in the day-to-day social aspects of keeping Indonesia running - from postal workers to school teachers - was part of Golkar. Following the downfall of Suharto and the lead-up to the June 7 general elections, Golkar steadily lost power and influence, downgrading its status to little more than another political party.

This leaves the military to act as Indonesia's sole unifying force even as splits within the military threaten to add to the current chaos. The question now is who controls what. With the army split into several factions, some facilitating and some working to end the violence, there are several hands possibly controlling the situation: Suharto and those loyal to him, Defense Minister and armed forces chief Gen Wiranto, and President B J Habibie. The alternative, and potentially most serious, is that no one is in control.

It is possible that elements loyal to Suharto are responsible for arming the pro-integration militias and continuing the violence. By some accounts, the Suharto family owns more than 40 percent of East Timor. This would likely be lost if East Timor gains independence. Much of the military-backed violence in the province has been blamed on the Kopassus, Indonesia's special forces, which until 1998 were led by Suharto's son-in-law, Lt Gen Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo's recent retirement did not end the close link between the Suharto family and the Kopassus. The high degree of cooperation between Kopassus forces and the Suharto family, as well as the 2,000 Kopassus troops in East Timor, raise questions of whether Habibie and Wiranto are involved.

If they are not, the presence of these elite forces raise doubts as to whether these two leaders can bring the military back into line. Wiranto plays a key role in the events in East Timor, and in overall military stability. Wiranto, who served under Suharto, has worked to maintain the military's strength under new political rules. He has positioned himself to remain in control of the military regardless of who becomes the next president. He has overseen the split of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) into the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI) and the Police (Polri). He also set the military apart as a politically independent organization, while establishing personal links to all major parties. While Wiranto maintains control over much of his institution, it is not clear if he can end the violence in East Timor - or if he wants to.

Having pledged to return stability to East Timor without UN assistance, Wiranto has laid his position on the line. If he is unable to control the pro-integration militia or the military, he will lose his legitimacy as head of the armed forces. However, it is possible that Wiranto does not want to see peace restored in East Timor. He may want to demonstrate the consequences of leaving the republic to other separatist movements in Indonesia. Wiranto may also be concerned about the precedent that would be set by withdrawing armed forces from East Timor
[ http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/090799.ASP ].

Alternately, Wiranto may have even instigated the outbreak of violence, in which case he would be just as capable of stopping it. The ability of the military to both foment and halt a crisis would be a clear signal to Jakarta of who is really in charge. While a sudden calm in East Timor would signal that Wiranto has been in control, it could also be the result of Wiranto making deals to heal the fractured armed forces. Either way, the military emerges as unified victor.

Habibie's hand in the situation is also unclear. The situation in East Timor has diverted attention away from economic scandals and the slow formation of Indonesia's new parliament. Habibie initiated the referendum, offering the province independence rather than simply greater autonomy. The offer came as a shock and was greeted with skeptical apprehension by both independence and integration advocates. The president may have made the offer to force the independence movement to consider the economic and security implications of their effort, hoping that the East Timorese would choose autonomy over the chaos of independence. But events have spun out of his control.

Conversely, Habibie may have been tempted to use East Timor to help control the selection of the next president. If East Timor requires the full attention of the government and military, and the military is unable to seal the splits in its ranks, Habibie can argue that changing regimes is too risky right now. At the same time, Habibie has gained international status by demonstrating that he would even allow a vote on independence.

While it is unclear that Suharto, Wiranto or Habibie are in control of East Timor, an even more ominous prospect is that no one is in control. The splits in the military have led to at least four potential factions: the majority who remain loyal to Wiranto; Suharto loyalists, including the elite Kopassus; the Indonesian police; and the military officers loyal to opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of former President Sukarno. Each of these factions, as well as potential local independent commanders operating under their own initiatives, may be attempting simultaneously to control the situation in East Timor. If Wiranto does not heal these splits, the potential for Indonesia is tremendous. With 6000 inhabited islands stretching across three time zones, and dozens of ethnic and religious groups, stability in Indonesia's military is vital.

The events in East Timor over the next week will offer more insight into just who controls the military. If at least the appearance of stability cannot be regained in a few days, international intervention is likely. But if no one controls the Indonesian military, whom would international forces face? The future of the republic may well rest on the resolution of the crisis in East Timor.

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