Asia Times: Formidable challenges await Timor intervention force



	September 10, 1999	atimes.com

Southeast Asia

Formidable challenges await Timor intervention force
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence
Update September 9, 1999

Summary:

Reports of continued violence and bloodshed in East Timor have intensified calls for international intervention. The UN has dispatched a five-member mission to Jakarta to press the Indonesian government to bring East Timor under control or give permission for a peacekeeping force to enter. While the world debates the political ramifications of sending in an international force, it is equally important to consider what such a force would face on the ground.

Analysis:

Calls for international intervention in East Timor have increased in urgency following the imposition of martial law on September 7. A five-member UN mission is in Jakarta to urge the Indonesian government either to bring East Timor under control or allow UN involvement in restoring the peace.

To date, Indonesia has refused to allow foreign intervention until after parliament meets in October to ratify the East Timor referendum results. Despite Indonesia's insistence that it be allowed to deal with its own internal problems, reports that military and police forces are contributing to the chaos in Dili lead us to believe that the military will not bring the situation under control any time soon.

As calls for international intervention increase - fueled by reports of massive human rights violations, political cleansing and massacres - so does the possibility of Indonesia bowing to international pressure and allowing a UN force into East Timor. Rumors of a military coup in the works, though quickly denied by the government, also substantiate the belief that a force may need to be sent in to quell the militias and ensure Indonesian stability.

What opposition would a UN peacekeeping force encounter? Given the abundant use of the term ''militia'' in the press, it is useful to clarify just what the term means. While media reports of pro-integration militia members attacking and killing pro-independence supporters abound, we believe the term ''militia'' is being applied too loosely. Western media often attribute actions by uniformed Indonesian police, army and special forces to pro-integration militia members. While the police and Indonesian military may be cooperating, and are linked historically with the militia, they are not one and the same. Many of the pro-integration militia were originally set up and armed by the Indonesian military as additional security forces in East Timor. Similar civilian militia have been established throughout Indonesia, including a 12,000-member militia established to help ensure order during the June general elections.

With the increasing chaos and confusion, it becomes important to assess just what opposition an international force would face if deployed to East Timor. East Timor currently has between 20,000 and 30,000 armed pro-integration militia fighters. These include groups like the Integration Fighters Force (PPI), the Red-White Storm and the United Front for Autonomy. The pro-integration militia are not a unified fighting force. Some are armed with weapons supplied by Indonesia's armed forces; others rely on more primitive weapons. Prior to the referendum, many of the pro-integration militias gathered near the border with West Timor, sending their family members across the border. From this staging point, the militias have begun moving east.

There is increasing evidence of splits within the militias, as well as within the military itself. Some recent reports suggest that fighting has broken out between various militia [ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/090899.ASP ] and the military. The fighting is reportedly due to disagreements whether or not to end the fighting.

Any international force entering East Timor would face a confused and disconnected militia, many armed with primitive weapons, but all quite familiar with the area's mountains and forests. They would also face some of Indonesia's military (including Kopassus, Indonesia's special forces), as it is unclear whether there is any command and control over troops in the area. Further emphasizing the lack of control, Indonesia announced September 8 it has replaced the army commander in East Timor.

The Kopassus in particular would present a formidable opposition. In addition to the 20,000 to 30,000 militia fighters, there are approximately 2,000 Kopassus members in East Timor, in addition to 15,000 army and 8,000 police. While a government-approved international force would not be challenged by the military as a whole, it would face elements no longer under Jakarta's control.

A UN force in East Timor would also be challenged operationally. East Timor has an underdeveloped transportation network and is mountainous, with peaks reaching over 9,700 feet. The militia control the western portion, as well as of much of Dili. Power and telephone service in Dili have been cut off and roadblocks have been established throughout the area. With the international presence having largely fled the area, there will be little intelligence regarding pro-integration or hostile Indonesian troop positions. The international force will have to rely on the pro-independence militias, which are largely holed up in mountain bases.

If an international force moves into East Timor to quell the chaos, it will face many challenges. The terrain offers an advantage to defending militias - an advantage that the Indonesian army was unable to overcome in more than two decades. Presenting further difficulty, rogue elements of the Indonesian armed forces will be equipped with modern weapons and techniques of a fully trained army with a line of supply. These obstacles and current political considerations make an intervention force unlikely. However, if the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, and political stability in Jakarta wanes further, the UN may find itself under increasing pressure to intervene.

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