Asia Times: US, Indonesia marching out of step


	April 27, 2002	atimes.com

Southeast Asia

US, Indonesia marching out of step
By Alan Boyd

SYDNEY - Indonesia and the United States have made their first tentative moves toward normalizing defense ties after a series of low-key meetings that showed just how little has changed since Jakarta was cut adrift 30 months ago.

US negotiators could hardly have been buoyed by the news that reform of the armed forces had again been subverted by political patronage; that valiant efforts to instill a human-rights ethnic had failed to check ethnic and sectarian strife in the provinces; and that the archipelago was letting religious sensitivities get in the way of its moral obligations to support the global offensive against terrorism.

But then, neither side set an especially high goal for the opening exchanges, which were dominated by the sort of handy catchphrases that diplomats like to trot out when the real issues are too hot to handle. The prime achievement so far, according to chief Indonesian negotiator Major-General Sudrajat, has been to "increase confidence and mutual understanding in the defense and security ties between the two countries".

In other words, Washington has let it be known that the arms tap will not be turned back on until its strategists have found someone they are prepared to deal with in Jakarta's Byzantine military establishment. Known by their Bahasa Indonesia acronym TNI, the Indonesian armed forces have undergone a subtle transformation since relations were first downgraded in 1998 in response to human rights abuses by special forces units. That censure was limited to a suspension of joint training exercises. But most remaining contacts were severed a year later when Jakarta failed to heed Washington's demands for Indonesian troops to stop harassing civilians in newly liberated East Timor.

Washington also let it be known that arms shipments and training programs would not be reactivated until political authority had been exercised over the freewheeling TNI. This meant greater accountability within the army and a more responsible leadership.

Much has changed in the interim, with President Megawati Sukarnoputri initiating Indonesia's first human-rights trial on the Timor debacle and quietly retiring some senior officers who resisted the march toward a more professional force. The trial, dripping with evidence of a high-level TNI conspiracy to set army-backed militias on the Timorese population, has been a revelation. Sitting in the dock are former East Timor governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares and the province's ex-police chief, Timbul Silaen, who had both been seen as untouchable before Megawati's intervention.

Yet it will take more than an occasional liberal wind in government and vague US threats to alter the mindset of sociopolitical patronage that lies at the heart of Indonesian institutional power. The newest leadership reshuffle, seemingly timed for the arrival of the US defense team in Jakarta, nominated air force and naval chiefs of staff from the current power clique who are both close to retirement. Slated to be filled in a pending reshuffle are the posts of army chief of staff, army commander and deputy commander; frontrunners for all three are also identified with the same former military college classes that hold sway in the TNI.

In rewarding officers with pre-retirement packages for their personal ties, the TNI has reinforced the impression that it is window-dressing on reforms and has no real intention of allowing in a new generation of leaders. Obviously this does not bode well for the wider democratization process that would underpin any renewal of Washington's ruptured dialogue with Jakarta, as it suggests that the TNI will remain at least a background force in government.

Standing in the way is a 1997 congressional edict that specifically prohibits the US administration from providing any military assistance to units of foreign armed military forces "that violate human rights with impunity". Commonly known as the Leahy Law after its main sponsor, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, the legislation was originally tacked on to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act as a lever against countries that failed to suppress trafficking in narcotics. However, it was broadened in 1998 to encompass all security assistance programs funded through the Foreign Operations Act, and again in the following year to include military training programs funded through appropriations.

The law states that aid cannot be provided to any unit of a foreign security service "if the secretary of state has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the secretary determines ... that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice".

As there are effectively two versions of the law based on the different appropriations and operations jurisdictions, some scope is offered for Secretary of State Colin Powell to overlook Indonesia's spotted rights record if a strong case can be made for restoring aid on strategic grounds. According to the appropriations law, Powell can cite "extraordinary circumstances" for a waiver, including evidence that corrective steps have been taken to improve a military unit's respect for individual rights.

Ambiguity over the interpretation of the term "corrective measures" offers a potential let-out. One interpretation is that aid could be restored purely be transferring an offending officer from his unit for the duration of a training exercise. Similarity, the law is unclear on the legal definition of a "unit". Based on precedents in Latin America, notably weapons cessations for anti-narcotics forces in Colombia, the law can be narrowly applied only to individual officers or particular commands. This frames a situation where aid might be denied to Indonesia's notorious Kopassus special forces for its central role in atrocities in Timor and West Papua, but allowed to other active units that were less involved.

A positive outcome in the Timor trial might provide sufficient grounds for a review of the Indonesian embargo, even if the government fails to pursue the four or five other ringleaders who have so far been permitted to remain at large. But it would be difficult to convince a skeptical US Congress that the hearings were anything more than a token and cynical gesture of accountability, while atrocities continue unabated in Papua, Aceh and Malacca.

On the other hand, Powell could easily find a persuasive security argument to justify the restoration of full military ties in the light of recent global events. It is a reasonable assumption that the events of September 11 in the US, coupled with a more unrational fear of Islamic fundamentalism, have convinced Powell that Washington needs to get on better terms with the world's biggest Muslim state.

One apparent trigger was the discovery shortly after the New York and Washington airplane bombings of a crude map of the US Embassy compound in Jakarta in the possession of suspected al-Qaeda extremists. Another was the existence of a reported terrorism training camp in Sulawesi that involved as many as 100 Middle Eastern and European operatives. Indonesia raided the remote house but found no conclusive evidence.

Diplomats say that US security services were rebuked by Washington for the poor intelligence availability on al-Qaeda in Indonesia, which was a legacy of the military downgrade as well as a misallocation of resources. Information flows have in fact been maintained at a high level between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency and their Indonesian equivalents since the breach in 1999, shifting more recently to shared data on laundered assets of extremists.

But for the greater part, the US agencies have simply been looking in the wrong direction. Rather than tracking isolated extremist factions, the preoccupation has been with internal political events and the strategic implications of a spreading secessionist movement on the regional economy and international shipping routes. This is hardly a surprise, given that about 50 percent of global commerce on a value basis passes through Indonesian waters on its way from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

There is nothing to stop the US from stepping up its information gathering without re-establishing formal military links. However, normalized relations would rebuild personal contacts and enable Washington to influence Indonesia's terrorism response, which has been curbed by religious sensitivities. The US has no desire to adopt a Philippines form of direct military intervention, as the passive Indonesian situation has little in common with the over-heated climate of kidnappings and bombings in Mindinao. But diplomats say it can ill-afford to be in the outer circle with a country that could become a valued ally in the widely anticipated struggle between the US and China for economic and political leadership in Southeast Asia.

Others also see the importance of this axis. Singapore and Malaysia, worried that an influx of extremists could destabilize their giant neighbor, have been plying political pressure for months; Singapore is even proposing a free-trade alliance that would lock in Washington and Jakarta. And then there is the fundamentalist threat, which has only shallow roots in Indonesia but may nonetheless provide enough motivation for Jakarta to put its house in order.

Megawati has privately told foreign diplomats that she views the growth of radical Islamic groups as a deeply worrying trend, though she has yet to find a way to reconcile this danger with the risks that a crackdown could spark social unrest.

Ultimately Powell will have to choose between domestic ambivalence at the behavior of Indonesia's armed forces and wider US economic interests. It won't happen overnight, but the short bets are on the strategic option.

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