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  May 22, 2002 atimes.com  

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Southeast Asia





Indonesia pays the price for compromise

By Richel Langit

JAKARTA – The nationalist-Islam coalition of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and Vice President Hamzah Haz is now cracking, shattering Indonesia's hopes for any early recovery from its protracted economic and political crises.

Once touted as the ideal pair, badly needed to carve the country out of its crises, the coalition has become a problem in itself which not only denies Indonesia hopes for a speedy recovery but also exacerbates political and security conditions due to huge conflicts of interest between the two leaders.

When Hamzah was elected vice president in July 2001, the public at large thought that the pair would become the perfect winning team. Megawati, whose party controls both the House and Assembly, needed a wider support base in view of opposition from Muslim communities which could not accept a woman becoming the head of state. The support of Muslim groups was then viewed as a prerequisite for her to govern the country effectively. The choice fell on Hamzah as he chairs the country's biggest Muslim-based political party, the PPP.

Hamzah, on the other hand, needed political legitimacy as his party has only 58 seats in the House's 500 members and less then 100 seats in the Assembly's 700 members. There was no doubt that the pair was considered the answer to the country's protracted economic and political crisis as the two leaders enjoyed both political and the people's legitimacy. Recent developments, however, show that the coalition has become a problem in itself as Megawati and Hamzah have yet to reconcile their differences and conflicting political interests.

The recent visit of Hamzah to detained Laskar Jihad commander Ja'far Umar Thalib provides a good example of how the two leaders have different political interests. Thalib was arrested on charges that he instigated violence in the religious conflict-torn province Maluku and of defamation. The arrest was decided in a cabinet meeting attended by both Megawati and Hamzah. But immediately after Thalib was arrested, Hamzah told police authorities to uphold the principle of the presumption of innocence and days after Thalib was detained at the Jakarta Police headquarters, Hamzah went out of his way to visit the man whom Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina had linked with the massacre of 12 Christians in Soya village, Ambon earlier this month.

The visit clearly indicates Hamzah's intervention in the arrest and investigation of Thalib in the hopes that Thalib's supporters would, in return, support Hamzah's PPP in the upcoming general elections. In so doing, Hamzah has effectively supported the presence of some 12,000 Laskar Jihad fighting against Christians in Maluku. This has run contrary to efforts by Megawati's administration to put an end to the violence that has claimed close to 10,000 innocent lives since it first broke out in January 1999.

For her part, Megawati, who was ushered into the presidential post in July 2001 after members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Indonesia's highest legislative body, impeached then president Abdurrahman Wahid, has continued to leave Hamzah out in the cold in making strategic decisions. The recent appointments of the vice president-secretary and president-director of state-owned flag-carrier Garuda Indonesia are just two examples where Megawati is going her own way, of course for her own political interests. In both instances, Megawati rejected Hamzah's nominees without giving any explanation.

As the vice-presidential post under the current constitution plays only a marginal, supporting role in the government, Hamzah has silently retaliated against Megawati by spearheading a move to file a petition demanding she explain the source of funds she donated to the Indonesian Military (TNI) and police in February. Some 50 legislators signed and submitted the petition to leaders of the House of Representatives (DPR). A House plenary meeting will now decide whether or not to exercise its right to inquire into the origin of the funds. If such is endorsed, Megawati will be required to explain before the House the source of Rp30 billion (US$3.3 million) funds she donated to the TNI and police. The move might undermine Megawati's credibility as her office had given conflicting explanations on the issue. More than that, leaders of virtually all Muslim-based political parties are close to setting up a political caucus similar to that of the Axis Group that shattered Megawati's presidential bid following the 1999 elections. The direction of such a political caucus has yet to be determined, but given accumulated disappointments among leaders of Islamic parties, it is very likely that those political parties are planning to "teach" Megawati a lesson.

While these moves are unlikely to unseat Megawati, the maneuvers would definitely weaken her political support and seriously undermine her authority. This could force Megawati to make political compromises with those political parties in order to survive. Political compromises may include giving Hamzah more say in the current government or appointing cadres of those Muslim parties to high positions in government institutions and/or state-owned enterprises.

Should Megawati enter into political compromises with those parties, new graft and corruption cases are likely to mushroom. The threat is very real as the 2004 general election is fast approaching and political parties, including Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) are now racing to collect campaign funds, by hook or by crook. With party cadres entering government institutions and state-owned enterprises, those offices and firms are likely to become cash cows for political parties that rely on vote-buying to boost their performance in the upcoming election.

The Rp30 billion financial assistance Megawati gave to TNI and police in February cannot help but be interpreted as early general election dole-outs in order to secure the backing of the country's powerful military in 2004.

Megawati, and especially the country, might have to pay for political compromises very dearly. Megawati's campaign against graft and corruption will be greatly undermined. More than that, the country's recovery from the current political and economic crises becomes more and more elusive.

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